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Abstract 
 
Responsibility for financial and macroeconomic stability implicitly or explicitly lies with the 
central bank, which therefore ought to address climate-related and other environmental  
risks on a systemic level. Furthermore, central banks, through their regulatory oversight  
over money, credit, and the financial system, are in a powerful position to support the 
development of green finance models and enforce an adequate pricing of environmental and 
carbon risk by financial institutions. The central topic of this paperare the public financial 
governance policies through which central banks, as well as other relevant financial 
regulatory agencies, can address environmental risk and promote sustainable finance.  
The paperfirst discusses the reasons why central banks should be concerned with aligning 
finance with sustainable development. Second, the paperreviews the tools and instruments 
that can be utilized by central banks and financial regulatory agencies to address 
environmental risk and promote green finance and sustainable development. Third, the 
paperprovides a brief review of green public financial governance initiatives. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Accord, 
investment will have to be directed away from carbon- and resource-intensive investments, 
and toward sustainable investment. Responsibility for financial and macroeconomic stability 
implicitly or explicitly rests with the central bank, which therefore ought to address climate-
related and other environmental risks on a systemic level. Furthermore, central banks, 
through their regulatory oversight over money, credit, and the financial system, are in a 
powerful position to support the development of sustainable finance approaches and enforce 
an adequate pricing of environmental and carbon risk by financial institutions (Volz 2017). 
Against this backdrop, the paper discusses the extent to which central banks should 
incorporate environmental considerations into their operations and reviews the public 
financial governance policies through which central banks, as well as other relevant financial 
regulatory agencies, can promote green finance.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the reasons why central banks 
should be concerned with aligning finance with sustainable development. In doing so, it 
differentiates between the impact of environmental factors on the conventional goals of 
central banking, and a potential promotional role of central banks with regard to green 
finance and sustainability. Subsequently, Section 3 reviews the tools and instruments that 
can be utilized by central banks and financial regulatory agencies to promote green finance 
and sustainable development. It also provides some examples of public green financial 
policies in different policy areas. Section 4 concludes. 
2. WHY CENTRAL BANKS SHOULD BE CONCERNED 
WITH ALIGNING FINANCE WITH SUSTAINABLE 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Green central banking can be defined as central banking that takes account of 
environmental risks, including risks from climate change, which may have a material impact 
on the short- and long-term stability and development of the financial sector and the 
macroeconomy. One can distinguish between central banks’ responses to environmental 
externalities affecting central banks’ traditional core responsibility of safeguarding 
macroeconomic and financial stability, and an activist role of central banks in “greening” the 
economy. Green central banking therefore describes, on the one hand, the process of taking 
environmental risk and other sustainability-related factors, such as climate-change-mitigation 
policy, into account in the design of monetary policy and financial regulation in the pursuit of 
the traditional goals of price and financial stability. This can be described as the passive 
aspect of green central banking because in pursuing their established goals, central banks 
may need to incorporate environmental factors into existing frameworks, for instance into 
macro-prudential frameworks, without pursuing a “sustainability agenda”. On the other hand, 
central banks may be mandated to actively use the tools at their disposal to promote green 
investment or discourage brown investment and play a “developmental role” (Dafe and Volz 
2015). 
2.1 The Importance of Environmental Factors for Conventional 
Goals of Central Banking 
The core responsibility of most central banks – often specified in the mandate as the singular 
or primary objective of monetary policy – is safeguarding low and stable inflation. Sometimes 
embedded in an inflation-targeting framework, this primary focus of central banks on price 
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stability is based on the theoretical and empirical understanding that low and stable inflation 
is a necessary precondition for growth or development to take place. Apart from maintaining 
low and stable inflation, safeguarding financial stability has traditionally been the other 
important concern for central banks, which, throughout history, have acted as lender of last 
resort. Although there was a trend since the 1990s to assign responsibility for financial 
stability to dedicated financial regulatory authorities, it has received renewed attention as a 
crucial central baking objective against the background of the Global Financial Crisis. A 
further (often secondary) goal of central banking is supporting wider economic policy 
objectives such as sustainable growth or, in some cases, maximum employment. A strong 
argument for central banks to take environmental factors into account in the conduct of 
monetary policy in the pursuit of their core objectives can be derived from how these central 
goals are affected by climate change and other environmental risks. 
2.1.1 Impact on Price Stability 
Prices and price variability, which are at the center of attention of most central banks, could 
be affected through various channels by anthropogenic climate change and an associated 
increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. To start with, climate 
change may have a significant impact on agricultural production, both domestic and abroad, 
and hence on food prices, which are an important component of consumer price inflation. 
For instance, climate change-related droughts and floods may have a significant impact on 
agricultural production and cause supply shocks and hence rising prices and cost-push 
inflation. For economies where agricultural production is a central pillar of the economy – 
which is often the case in developing economies – climate change effects on the agricultural 
sector may also have a broader impact on aggregate income and employment. While a first 
concern is how climate change-related hazards may directly affect prices, a second issue of 
concern is the potential impact of climate-change-mitigation policy on inflation. An important 
issue in this context is the potential impact that climate-change-mitigation policies may have 
on energy production and prices (Volz 2017). McKibbin et al. (2017) discuss how different 
climate change policy regimes – carbon policies such as a carbon tax, a permit trading 
system, and other regulatory measures – could theoretically affect different monetary policy 
regimes. In a scenario where the introduction of a carbon tax causes aggregate output to 
decline and inflation to spike, no response by the central bank would yield a permanently 
lower output level and no change in the long-term growth rate. In the case of a strict inflation-
targeting regime, the central bank would respond to the spike in inflation by raising interest 
rates, thereby further slowing the economy, but also causing exchange rate appreciation. 
While both would have a depreciating effect on inflation, the overall decline in output would 
be worse than in the case without central bank intervention. McKibbin et al. also discuss 
implications for other monetary policy regimes, including flexible-inflation targeting and price-
level targeting, and come to the overall conclusion that solely responding to the inflationary 
component, without taking rising prices and decreasing output resulting from climate policy 
into account, may lead to unnecessarily large output losses. Monetary policy therefore has to 
take into account climate-related effects on food or energy prices, as well as the impact of 
climate mitigation policies because of potentially important implications for core inflation. 
2.1.2 Impact on Financial Stability 
To the extent that environmental damages and climate-related risks affect the stability of 
banks, insurance firms and other financial actors, they need to be of concern for central 
banking. Thus far, only a few central banks and financial regulators have been concerned 
with environmental risk, and even fewer have considered it as part of their systemic risk 
framework, even though risks arising from climate change can constitute a significant 
systemic risk for the financial sector and economies at large (Volz 2017). However, a broad 
consensus is emerging that climate change and related mitigation policies will have 
substantial repercussions on the functioning of economies and hence, financial systems 
(Bank of England 2015; Carney 2015). 
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Three different types of risk through which climate change may affect financial systems have 
been identified: transitional risk, physical risk, and liability risk (Carney 2015). Transitional 
risk describes the uncertainty associated with policy, price, and valuation changes that may 
occur in the process of mitigating climate change and reducing carbon emissions. 
International goals, such as limiting global warming to two degrees, will require powerful 
policy initiatives, such as the introduction of carbon taxes or extensive environmental 
regulation, which will affect the valuation of carbon-intensive businesses and may render 
assets of coal, gas, and oil companies less valuable with potential systemic repercussions in 
case these policy changes have not been priced in. Volz (2017) also discusses the 
development of new technologies in the process of climate-change-mitigation that may 
render existing technologies redundant, and the associated revaluation of assets, as a 
potential source of financial instability, which, if they do not occur in a gradual manner, may 
have systemic implications. 
Physical risk describes the risk of natural hazards, such as floods and storms, which may 
cause direct damages to an economy, as well as indirectly through the disruption of global 
supply changes. Climate-related damages and risks are understood to be potentially 
significant and to not only cause disruptions for individual firms or sectors, but also have 
systemic repercussions for the economy and therefore, financial stability. Increasing levels of 
physical risk can be expected to have particularly large repercussions for the insurance 
sector. As recognized by the Bank of England (2015), climate change-induced and other 
vital environmental changes therefore have clear implications for central banks because they 
may negatively affect the stability of financial institutions and systems. Pricing in physical 
risks is an essential step in avoiding these negative repercussions for the economy and 
seems especially crucial for the valuation of long-term investments. 
Thirdly, liability risk describes climate or environmental risks that occur from uncertainty 
surrounding potential financial losses and compensation claims stemming from damages 
caused by climate change-related natural hazards (Bank of England 2015; Carney 2015). 
Agents may seek compensation for financial damages from carbon extractors or emitters 
and environmental polluters, creating repercussions for the insurance sector and hence, for 
central banks that provide third-party liability insurance (Bank of England 2015). 
Overall, a consensus has been emerging in the central banking community that climate 
change-related natural disasters can create and intensify risks to the stability of the financial 
system, and that potential disruptions from climate change ought to be analyzed and taken 
into account by central banks, especially if central banks are responsible for safeguarding 
financial stability (Bank of England 2015; Carney 2015). 
 
2.2 Sustainable Development as a Goal of Central Banking 
The second dimension of green central banking – i.e., an active contribution to a greening of 
the financial system and the economy as a whole by central banks – has been more 
contentious. As will be discussed in the next section, central banks have numerous powerful 
tools at their disposal to affect credit allocation and the investment behavior of financial 
firms. Whether and to what extent a central bank should use its powers and actively engage 
in “greening” the financial system and the economy depends on two factors: its legal 
mandate, and the extent to which it is best placed to correct certain types of market failures, 
taking into account the ability and suitability of other policy institutions to steer the green 
transformation (Volz 2017). 
2.2.1 Mandated Responsibility 
For central banks to assume an active “greening” role, an explicit legal mandate is required 
to pursue environmental and sustainability objectives, given the potentially distributive 
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consequences. In most of today’s advanced economies, central banks have a relatively 
narrow mandate with a primary objective of pursuing price stability and, in some cases, 
financial stability. As discussed, such narrow mandates arguably require central banks to 
explore climate and environmental risks with regard to these core goals, but they do not 
mandate them to go further and to actively promote sustainability and green finance. In 
many developing and emerging economies, central bank mandates are more 
comprehensive and include sustainability, as well as social and economic objectives. This is 
reflected by the fact that central banks in many developing and emerging economies have 
been comparatively more active in promoting green finance and sustainable development, 
as will be discussed below. Dikau and Ryan-Collins (2017) take a closer look at the legal 
mandates and objectives of those central banks in emerging economies that most actively 
pursue green central banking policies. The legal mandate of Bangladesh Bank, the central 
bank of Bangladesh, for example, includes supporting economic growth and development as 
a secondary objective, based on which Bank Bangladesh has stated that it understands the 
greening of the financial system and the economy to be within its responsibility (Bangladesh 
Bank 2011). Furthermore, Banco Central do Brasil, the central bank of Brazil, which serves 
as financial regulator and supervisor, is tasked with promoting balanced development and to 
serve the collective interest, implying a sustainability objective for the central bank (Brasil 
1988). While the mandate of the People’s Bank of China includes the overreaching objective 
of maintaining price stability and thereby promoting economic growth, it also requires the 
central bank to implement the orders of the State Council, potentially involving the central 
bank in far-reaching policy initiatives, such as the promotion of green finance and 
sustainability (People’s Republic of China 2003). 
Nonetheless, there are also risks involved with overstretching the mandates of central banks 
to include sustainability objectives. Volz (2017) highlights problems associated with 
potentially conflicting objectives of central banks, and dangers regarding the accountability of 
central banks. He also points to the prevailing central banking paradigm as limiting the 
extent to which mandates can or should be extended and how existing ones may be 
interpreted to include green sustainability objectives. 
2.2.2 The Market Failure Argument 
Achieving the global climate targets will not only require the financial sector to play a central 
role in financing sustainable and green investment, but also to restrict funding for 
environmentally harmful activities. In the absence of public intervention, banks and other 
financial institutions may allocate their resources to environmentally and socially undesirable 
activities, such as carbon-intensive or polluting ventures in order to maximize their private 
returns. This discrepancy between environmental and social returns, and private returns 
represents a market failure or imperfection that may call for efficiency-enhancing 
government intervention. That free markets do not necessarily yield Pareto-efficient 
allocations has been investigated by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), based on the 
understanding that if information is incomplete or asymmetric, or when markets are 
incomplete, outcomes may not be efficient and can be improved through the intervention of 
the government. With regard to the allocation of credit, Stiglitz (1994) discusses an 
efficiency-enhancing role of credit policies based on the assumption that the private returns 
of commercial bank lending are not necessarily congruent with social returns. He argues that 
in order to overcome these discrepancies between private and social return, directed credit, 
restricted lending to some activities, and promoting investment in others may be justified. 
With regard to sustainable growth and green finance, externalities that cause an 
environmentally suboptimal allocation of credit by commercial banks and other market 
participants may call for a more active, market-correcting role of central banks. 
Nonetheless, intervention by the central bank conceptually constitutes a second-best 
solution to the problem of market imperfection. The preferable first-best solution would be 
the removal of the market failure. For instance, a carbon pricing mechanism that internalizes 
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the social costs of carbon emissions would constitute a preferred, first-best, market failure-
correcting policy that may prevent or dis-incentivize environmentally undesirable investment; 
the problem, however, is that such first-best policies may not always be politically feasible or 
may take a long time to establish (Volz 2017). In the case where the optimality conditions of 
fixing market failure cannot be satisfied, the intervention of the central bank through 
environmental financial regulation or the interference into the allocation of resources can be 
interpreted as a second-best solution based on the theory of the second best by Lipsey and 
Lancaster (1956)(Volz 2017). In practice, second-best policies could be implemented by 
mandating central banks to address such externalities by affecting the creation and 
allocation of credit.  
Central banks and other financial regulatory authorities can influence investment decisions 
and the allocation of resources and credit through a number of different policy 
implementation instruments, which are discussed in greater detail below. Their regulatory 
oversight over money, credit, and the financial system puts central banks in a uniquely 
powerful position that enables them to incentivize or direct resources away from carbon-
intensive sectors and toward green investment. Especially in developing countries, central 
banks typically have a strong institutional standing that enables them to shape policy 
outcomes in ways that other public institutions, such as environmental ministries, are unlikely 
to achieve. However, given their power, the points made about central banks’ mandate and 
accountability discussed above are very important. 
Historically, credit allocation policies and various other instruments of “financial repression” 
were widely used and have led in many cases to substantial distortions of financial systems 
with often unwanted repercussions for savings and prices; in many cases, the consequence 
was the underdevelopment of financial markets. While the historic success or failure of credit 
allocation and financial repression policies is subject to on-going debate, such instruments 
stand in strong contrast to the widely accepted notion of the neutrality of monetary policy and 
central banks in general toward different investment classes, sectors, or types of firms. 
Allocating financial resources toward or away from certain sectors and companies implies 
favoring certain segments of the economy over others and appears to be incompatible with 
our modern understanding of independent central banks. Nonetheless, many central banks 
in emerging and developing economies have resorted to these policies as viable, second-
best solutions to promote sustainable development and green investment. The notion of the 
neutrality of monetary policy has come under intense scrutiny more recently, not least in the 
context of discussions about the distributional consequences of the negative interest and 
quantitative easing policies adopted by major central banks. 
Another kind of market failure involves missing or incomplete financial markets that impede 
the trading of different forms of credit, assets, or risks (Volz 2017). While central banks most 
certainly have a role to play in financial market development and in establishing primary and 
secondary markets for securities, as well as money and exchange markets where none exist 
(Gray and Talbot 2007), they may also be in a position to aid development of new green 
market segments by, for instance, creating a regulatory environment that promotes green 
bonds issuances and trading in secondary markets. 
3. TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL BANKS TO 
ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND PROMOTE 
GREEN FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
Central banks and financial regulatory agencies can employ numerous policy instruments to 
achieve sustainability targets (Volz 2017). This section distinguishes five different policy 
areas, including micro-prudential regulation, macro-prudential regulation, financial market 
development, credit allocation, and central bank soft power and guidelines. For each of the 
five policy areas, a number of different policy implementation tools and instruments are 
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discussed and then illustrated through examples of central banks that have employed the 
discussed tools. It is apparent that central banks in developing and emerging economies 
especially, and in Asia in particular, have been at the forefront of using a broad range of 
instruments to address environmental risk and encourage green investment (Volz 2016, 
2018; Dikau and Ryan-Collins 2017). Central banks in advanced economies have only 
recently started to address the implications of climate change for monetary and financial 
stability, with a leading role of the Bank of England, which has played a central role in raising 
awareness of the implications of climate change risks amongst central banks (Bank of 
England 2015; Carney 2015). A more comprehensive overview of the steps central banks 
around the world have taken to align the financial system with sustainability targets is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
3.1 Green Micro-prudential Regulation 
Many instruments of financial regulation can be calibrated to encourage or require financial 
institutions to consider climate and environmental risks in their operations with regard to the 
loan origination process or financial stability concerns. Central banks and other financial 
regulatory authorities can require banks and other financial institutions to adopt 
Environmental & Social (E&S) risk-management standards, to assess and disclose climate-
related risks, or to adjust reserve holdings. 
3.1.1 Disclosure Requirements 
Effective disclosure requirements for banks and other financial institutions of climate change-
related risks can play a central role in ensuring that the impact of climate change, climate 
policies, and natural hazards are correctly priced in by financial institutions. The Financial 
Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) discusses 
disclosure requirements as a central element of forming a response to climate and 
environmental risk based on the understanding that a lack of information of risk exposure of 
financial institutions entails consequences for financial stability, because the misallocation or 
mispricing of assets may cause abrupt price corrections in financial markets at a later stage 
(TCFD 2016). Mandatory disclosure requirements for all financial institutions could be a 
regulatory instrument to achieve this goal. Furthermore, Volz (2017) points out that 
improving transparency with regard to climate-related risks and the appropriate pricing of 
these risks are pre-conditional for green macro-prudential regulation, which is discussed 
below.  
3.1.2 E&S Risk-management Standards 
Similar to disclosure requirements, financial regulation that endorses mandatory E&S risk-
management standards requires financial institutions to incorporate E&S risk factors into 
their governance frameworks. With the aim of enforcing climate-related risk management 
beyond disclosure, green E&S risk-management standards may also establish 
environmental and social rules for banks’ lending practices by requiring the assessment of 
these risks, as well as taking into account potentially harmful environmental effects of new 
financial services and products. Furthermore, mandatory green risk management standards 
could oblige banks to include an assessment of E&S risks in the loan origination process as 
a criterion based on which loans are extended. This would likely also have allocative 
consequences by reducing the flow of finance to polluting and energy intensive firms and 
enhancing the financing of greener projects. 
3.1.3 Reserve Requirements 
Reserve requirements determine the minimum amount of reserves that must be held by 
commercial banks. They could be calibrated to create incentives leading to the promotion of 
green assets or make brown lending less attractive. Differential reserve requirements that 
ADBI Working Paper 867 Dikau and Volz 
 
7 
 
are linked to the compositions of banks’ portfolios, allowing lower (higher) required reserve 
rates for portfolios skewed toward greener, less carbon-intensive assets (brown, carbon-
intensive assets) can potentially influence the allocation of credit and promote green 
investments. Another approach discussed in the literature is the acceptance of carbon 
certificates as part of commercial banks’ legal reserves in order to enhance the market for 
carbon certificates and by distributing carbon certificates that are exchangeable for loan 
concessions to low-carbon projects, creating an incentive to further enhance green 
investment (Rozenberg et al. 2013). 
3.1.4 Green Financial Regulation in Practice 
Green financial regulatory measures have been employed in a number of countries thus far, 
including Bangladesh, Brazil, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the PRC, first 
environmental regulatory policies by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) date back to the 
1980s (Zadek and Chenghui 2014). The Green Credit Policy that was launched jointly by the 
PBC, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission in 2007 has been one of the most comprehensive regulatory green policies to 
date, addressing the banking system, insurance, and securities markets. Furthermore, in 
2006 the PBC created a database for credit consisting of information on credit, fines, and 
environmental compliance of firms as a source of information on which to base restrictions of 
credit to blacklisted companies and sectors. 
Differential reserve requirements have been employed by Banque du Liban, the central bank 
of Lebanon, with the goal of influencing the allocation of credit in favor of investment in 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. Commercial banks are incentivized to increase the 
share of green lending projects of their loan portfolio by allowing “greener” banks to hold 
lower reserves (Banque du Liban 2010). Commercial banks that extend loans to finance 
projects that entail energy savings potential are subject to lower reserve requirements. In 
practice, the Lebanese Centre for Energy Conservation, a governmental agency, verifies 
whether the underlying investments would contribute to greening the energy sector and 
declares the bank loans that finance them eligible for receiving the preferential reserve 
requirement treatment. 
3.2 Green Macro-prudential Regulation 
Macro-prudential regulation aims to mitigate systemic risks that threaten the stability of the 
financial system as a whole. It is applied to close the gap between macroeconomic policy 
and micro-prudential regulation and can play a central role in incorporating climate and 
environmental risks into regulatory frameworks. The application of many macro-prudential 
policy tools to identify and mitigate environmental risks may also have allocative 
consequences for credit (Schoenmaker and Tilburg 2016). 
3.2.1 Climate-related Stress Testing 
Climate-related stress tests can fulfill the task of assessing the potential impact that natural 
hazards may have on the economy, the health of individual financial institutions, and the 
financial system as a whole. Apart from enabling the evaluation of the resilience of the 
financial system to adverse shocks, climate-related stress tests would also be necessary to 
calibrate green macro-prudential policy instruments and to allow for the incorporation of the 
identified vulnerabilities into capital buffers, risk weights, and caps. 
3.2.2 Counter-cyclical Capital Buffers 
Counter-cyclical capital buffers are employed to mitigate the financial cycle and can  
be calibrated with regard to environmental risks to ease the potential effect of the pricing-in 
of a so-called “carbon bubble” that describes the expected sudden re-pricing of carbon-
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intensive assets due to of stricter emission targets and environmental policy. In practice, 
higher capital requirements for carbon-intensive credit growth could be applied 
(Schoenmaker and Tilburg 2016). 
3.2.3 Differentiated Capital Requirements 
Through capital requirements, financial regulators require financial institutions to hold a 
certain percentage of capital for risk-weighted assets, which is usually expressed in the 
Capital to Risk (Weighted) Assets Ratio. Capital requirements could theoretically 
differentiate asset classes based on sustainability criteria and assign higher risk weights to 
carbon-intensive assets in anticipation of future negative and sudden price developments. 
Schoenmaker and Tilburg (2016) stress differential capital requirements as a central policy 
tool that enables the correct pricing of carbon risks. Furthermore, this instrument may also 
have important allocative consequences for credit by incentivizing the disinvestment from 
carbon-intensive assets and dependent sectors. 
3.2.4 Loan-to-value and Loan-to-income Caps 
Limiting the extension of credit by banks to certain industries and the investment in specified 
asset classes can also be used as an allocative tool to limit the flow of resources to sectors 
or companies that exceed specified carbon-emission targets. 
3.2.5 Large Exposure Restrictions 
Exposure restrictions by counter-party, sector, or geographic area is a macro-prudential 
policy tool employed to limit the exposure of financial institutions to assets entailing high 
risks or, with regard to green finance, a high-carbon intensity. While the primary aim might 
therefore be to protect financial institutions against a carbon bubble, Schoenmaker and 
Tilburg (2016) argue that this instrument could also be employed for the fine-tuning of 
lending restrictions and the allocation of credit. 
3.2.6 Identification of Systemically Important Financial Institutions  
and Capital Surcharges 
Applying capital surcharges for institutions with high exposure to carbon-intensive assets 
could alter the identification of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) and 
ensure that climate risks are appropriately accounted for in order to reduce systemic risk.  
3.2.7 Green Macro-prudential Regulation in Practice 
The Banco Central do Brasil has been among the first central banks to address climate-
related environmental, as well as social, risks on a systemic level through the issuance of 
binding amendments to its macro-prudential regulatory framework. In 2011, the Banco 
Central do Brasilextended its requirements on the Internal Process of Capital Adequacy 
Assessment, which originates from Pillar 2 of the Basel II accords and requires commercial 
banks to take the exposure to environmental damages and risks into account (Banco Central 
do Brasil 2011). These capital requirements aim at pricing-in environmental risks and are 
part of the Banco Central do Brasil’s broader green banking regulatory approach, through 
which it requires banks to evaluate and consider E&S in their lending practices, to stress-test 
against the exposure to environmental risks, and to furthermore issue annual reports 
outlining their risk assessment methods and exposure to social and environmental damages 
(Banco Central do Brasil, 2017). 
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3.3 Green Financial Market Development 
The development of green security markets and green lending is another area where central 
banks could play an assisting role. In many of today’s advanced economies, the evolution of 
financial markets precedes the establishment of central banks. However, central banks in 
developing countries can play a central role in supporting the development of financial 
markets and encourage active trading in bond markets to encourage other actors to 
participate (Gray and Talbot 2007). With regard to green bonds, policy-directed development 
banks such as the European Investment Bank of Germany’s KfW have so far played this 
market-developing role in many countries by issuing the first green bonds and thereby aiding 
the creation of green bond markets. Central banks and other financial agencies can create 
an enabling environment for the issuance and trading of such green securities. 
3.3.1 Information Disclosure Requirements 
Through the introduction of effective procedures for the disclosure of environmental and 
sustainability-related information on bonds and other assets, central banks and regulatory 
agencies can strengthen the identification and acceptance of green assets. 
3.3.2 Green Bond Guidelines 
In order to encourage the issuance of green bonds, central banks can issue green bond 
guidelines and define criteria according to which the financing of projects and firms qualifies 
as green bonds, what the use of the proceeds from the bond issuance can be, as well as 
disclosure standards. Establishing and enforcing criteria for green bond labels can be a 
further step in promoting green bond issuance. 
3.3.3 Green Financial Market Development in Practice 
A central bank that has played an active role in encouraging the development of green bond 
markets and innovative market institutions is the PBC. The Green Finance Task Force, an 
international cooperative group initiated by the PBC in cooperation with UNEP Inquiry with 
the aim of developing an action plan for the promotion of green finance in the PRC, 
recommended that the PBC, together with the PRC’s banking and securities regulatory 
agencies, should issue industry guidelines for green bonds (PBOC and UNEP Inquiry 2015). 
The PBC issued the first official green bond guidelines in December 2015 to encourage 
unified standards for the issuance of green bonds (PBOC 2016). 
3.4 Green Credit Allocation 
Even though many of the policy instruments discussed above have potentially allocative 
consequences, there are also dedicated credit allocation instruments. These are not widely 
in use today by central banks in advanced economics but remain fairly popular in many 
developing and emerging economies. For central banks that employ credit allocation policies 
today with regard to green finance, most notably Bank Bangladesh and the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI), green investment has often been added as an additional priority sector to 
existing and long-standing credit allocation policy schemes that otherwise pursue 
developmental objectives (Dikau and Ryan-Collins 2017). Fry (1995), who makes a strong 
case against financial repression and credit allocation policies, lists subsidized loan rates for 
priority sectors, differential rediscount rates, direct budgetary subsidies, credit floors and 
ceilings, and the proliferation of development banks as the central allocative policy 
instruments, many of which can also be applied to promote green investment and 
sustainable development. 
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3.4.1 Targeted Refinancing Lines 
Green-targeted refinancing lines by central banks offer refinancing for commercial banks at 
preferential terms for specified green asset classes, thereby compensating or 
overcompensating financial institutions for lending at lower-than-market interest rates to low-
carbon or otherwise sustainable projects. However, this policy tool is only relevant in 
economies with relatively underdeveloped secondary security markets and hence a lack of 
market-based refinancing options for banks, which necessitates that central banks offer 
refinancing lines, some of which can be offered at preferred terms. 
3.4.2 Minimum and Maximum Credit Quotas 
Mandatory or minimum or maximum credit quotas or floors are fixed lending requirements 
that are set by the central bank and require commercial banks to allocate a percentage of 
their loan portfolio to specified classes of assets, industries, or geographical areas. Green 
minimum credit quotas, for example, require banks to lend at least a specified quota to green 
investments, while maximum credit ceilings could be utilized to restrict lending to carbon-
intensive industries. In contrast to all policy instruments discussed so far, the operating 
channel of credit quotas is not the creation of incentives for financial institutions to channel 
their resources to preferred causes, but a mandatory “hard” quota, which may potentially 
create severe market distortions. 
3.4.3 Preferred Interest Rates for Priority Sectors 
Credit interest rate ceilings for priority sectors, asset classes, and firms are the central 
instruments of financial repression policy. The administrative setting of interest rates by the 
central bank of commercial banks’ lending rate with the aim of promoting green investment 
and curbing unsustainable lending is another heavy interventionist central banking tool that 
is not aimed at creating incentives, but instead targets the setting  
of lower rates for preferred sectors or higher rates for less preferred ones in order to reduce 
funding. 
3.4.4 Central Bank Assistance to Development Banks 
 
As specialized financial institutions, development banks can play an important assisting role 
in financing the green transformation by providing long-term investment (Stern 2016; UNEP 
Inquiry 2016). The failure of private financial institutions to provide the required financial 
resources for substantial investments into greening the economy has been interpreted as 
justification for the presence of development banks. The latter may play a risk-reducing and 
pioneering role by implementing green finance standards or by developing innovative 
financial products such as green bonds, thereby encouraging private institutions to engage 
in green lending and long-term finance activities. Historically, central banks have often 
played a supportive role for development banks by subscribing to the initial equity or by 
buying and creating markets for bonds issued by development banks (Brimmer 1971). 
However, concerns have been raised that refinancing of public development banks by 
central banks may amount to monetary financing, which may cause inflation and undermine 
central bank independence. 
3.4.5 Green Credit Allocation in Practice 
Bangladesh Bank has introduced several policy initiatives to guide credit toward green 
sectors and to encourage banks to extend loans for renewable energy projects. Among the 
green credit allocation programs of Bank Bangladesh, targeted refinancing lines have been 
the most prominent policy tool. They were first utilized in 2009 when Bangladesh Bank 
established a revolving refinancing scheme amounting to BDT 2 billion through which 
commercial banks were compensated at reduced interest rates for loans extended for 
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sustainable investment projects (Bangladesh Bank 2017). Subsequently, Bangladesh Bank 
has developed further green refinancing lines, such as in 2015, when it earmarked a $200 
million refinancing window for refinancing green loans, with the specific aim of supporting 
investment improving water and energy usage (UNEP Inquiry et al. 2015) and in 2016, 
through the creation of a Green Transformation Fund, another green refinancing window 
worth $200 million targeting loans that finance the import of environmentally friendly 
machinery in order to improve sustainability in the leather and textiles sector (Bangladesh 
Bank 2017). 
The RBI’s Priority Sector Lending (PSL) program, which has its origins in 1949, is another 
example of a heavily interventionist approach to credit allocation. The PSL forces 
commercial banks to allocate 40% of adjusted net bank credit or credit equivalent amount of 
off-balance sheet exposure, whichever is higher, to sectors and causes specified by the 
central bank – traditionally agriculture, infrastructure, education, and SMEs. Following an 
internal review by the RBI, the PSL was extended in 2015 to include lending for social 
infrastructure and renewable energy projects as two new categories qualifying to be listed 
under commercial banks’ PSL requirements. 
3.5 Other Supportive Green Central Bank Initiatives 
Through their central position in the financial system and the powers vested in them, central 
banks have a lot of convening or soft power (Volz 2017). By promoting a discussion of 
climate change-related risks and environmental issues, the central  
bank can drive the sustainability agenda in the financial sector. The expertise and special 
status of central banks as a result of their unique relation to the government and the financial 
sector allow them to influence the discussion on green finance in informal ways. 
3.5.1 Green Finance Guidelines and Frameworks 
Central banks are in a good position to create or endorse industry-led, non-mandatory, 
green finance guidelines, which may set out guidelines for the issuance of green bonds, E&S 
risk-management practices, or general criteria for green lending. In many emerging and 
developing economies where green credit guidelines exist, these tend to be either voluntary 
industry-led green finance guidelines or, in most cases, central bank-led ones that often 
serve as foundation for the creation of mandatory green credit regulation at a later stage 
(Dikau and Ryan-Collins 2017). 
3.5.2 Soft Power 
Central banks can also influence the reception, knowledge, and practice of green finance 
through its convening role and soft power, by including environmental issues and climate 
change on its wider agenda and signaling the importance of these issues to market 
participants. The generally well-respected research departments of central banks are 
furthermore uniquely positioned to research topics around green finance and the impact of 
climate risks on the financial system. The research focus and output of central banks usually 
has a huge impact on raising awareness of its issues and directing broader macroeconomic 
research. Another area where central banks can contribute to the knowledge of green 
finance and threat of environmental risks are capacity-building workshops and seminars for 
bankers and investors, thereby addressing a potential lack of expertise on green financial 
issues, which has been identified as holding back the prevalence of E&S risk-management 
practices. Finally, the participation of central banks in international bodies and networks, 
such as the Financial Stability Board and its TCFD, which discuss standards and methods of 
policy engagement, also play an important role in finding internationally coherent 
approaches to greening the financial system. 
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3.5.3 Supportive Green Central Bank Initiatives in Practice 
The Bank of England’s engagement with climate change is an exemplar of a central bank’s 
use of soft power to raise awareness of climate end environmental risks for the financial 
sector. With his much-noticed speech in 2015 on “Breaking the Tragedy of  
the Horizon – Climate change and financial stability” (Carney 2015), the Governor of  
the Bank of England brought global attention to the potential systemic ramifications  
of climate change-related risks for the financial system and especially the insurance sector, 
thereby also motivating further research in the Bank of England’s research department on 
climate change and green finance (Bank of England 2015; Batten et al. 2016), as well as the 
organization of workshops and conferences on the issue. The Bank of England also 
engages with a number of international initiatives, including  
the TCFD, as well as taking part in the Sustainable Investment Forum and by  
co-chairing the G20 Green Finance Study Group (which was recently renamed into G20 
Sustainable Finance Study Group) that was established during the PRC’s G20 presidency, 
together with the PBC. 
Non-mandatory green finance guidelines, principles, or roadmaps that focus on sustainable 
banking have so far been issued by 17 members of the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC)’s Sustainable Banking Network, a knowledge sharing network for financial regulators 
and banking associations aiming at enhancing E&S risk-management practices and green 
lending of financial institutions.1 Furthermore, in December 2017, central banks and financial 
supervisors, among them the Bank of England, the Banque de France, De Nederlandsche 
Bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the European Central Bank, the Banco de España, the 
National Bank of Belgium, the OesterreichischeNationalbank and the PBC jointly created the 
Network for Greening the Financial System as a voluntary information and best practice 
sharing framework with the aim of mainstreaming green finance and more sustainable 
growth. This network potentially represents one of the most powerful initiatives to date, 
bringing the largest and most influential monetary and regulatory institutions together under 
the declared joint goal of supporting the transition toward more sustainable economies. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Climate and other environmental risks have increasingly become important topics for central 
banks and financial regulators. It is now largely accepted that environmental risks can have 
material impact on financial and macroeconomic stability, and an increasing number of 
central banks have started to develop micro- and macro-prudential frameworks that 
incorporate risks related to climate change and the environment. At a recent meeting of 
financial supervisors, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney highlighted: “Once climate 
change becomes a clear and present danger to financial stability, it may already be too late 
[…]. Our responsibility is to work in a way that puts the financial system as a whole in a 
position so it can adjust in a smooth and effective and orderly fashion as climate policies 
adapt” (Hook 2018). Carney (2018) also reiterated that “[t]he catastrophic impacts of climate 
change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most actors” in the financial sector, and 
that central banks should therefore use their unique position and oversight over financial 
markets to point out these risks and make sure that they are sufficiently addressed by 
financial institutions. The paper also highlighted the potential developmental role of central 
banks and reasoned why central banks, especially those in developing economies, may be 
mandated by governments to use various instruments at their disposal to promote green or 
discourage brown lending and investment. However, it needs to be emphasized that in many 
cases central banks may not be the public institutions that will be best positioned to correct 
                                                
1 The 17 members include financial authorities and banking associations from Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, 
the PRC, Colombia, Equador, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, South 
Africa, Turkey, and Viet Nam. 
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market failures that lead to overinvestment in socially undesirable activities. The reader 
should therefore not finish this piece with the impression that the authors want central banks 
to become responsible for fixing all environmental problems. Nevertheless, in cases where 
first-best policies are impossible to implement, targeted policy interventions by central banks 
or other financial regulators may indeed be considered and introduced. 
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ANNEX: SUSTAINABLE FINANCE POLICIES 
 Brazil 
2008 Banco Central do Brasil: Starting in 2008, resolutions issued on environmental regulation, 
restricting lending to firms that operate in vulnerable geographic areas such as the Amazonas 
region (Resolution 3,545/2008, Resolution 3,813 Resolution 3,896/2010 and Resolution 
4,008/2011) 
2009 Brazilian Banking Association: Voluntary green finance guidelines adopted by commercial and 
state-owned banks  
2011 Banco Central do Brasil: Resolution 3,988 incorporates risk of exposure to environmental damages 
into “Internal Process of Capital Adequacy Assessment” (ICAAP) requirements 
2014 Banco Central do Brasil: Guidelines on “Social and Environmental Responsibility for Financial 
Institutions” discusses and defines E&S risk exposure 
 Bangladesh 
2008 Bangladesh Bank: Circular on “Mainstreaming Corporate Social Responsibility in Banks and 
Financial Institutions in Bangladesh” 
2011 Bangladesh Bank: “Policy Guidelines for Green Banking” and “Guidelines on Environmental Risk 
Management” 
2015 Bangladesh Bank: Mandatory Green Finance Credit Targets l 
2016 Bangladesh Bank: “Integrated Risk Management Guidelines for Financial Institutions” 
2017 Bangladesh Bank: Guidelines on Environmental & Social Risk Management for Banks and 
Financial Institutions 
 Canada 
2014 Toronto Stock Exchange and CPA Canada: “A Primer for Environmental and Social Disclosure 
Ontario” 
Ministry of Finance: Regulation 235/14, amending the Pension Benefits Act and requiring pension 
plan administrators to disclose whether and if E&S risk factors are incorporated 
2017 Green Ontario Fund created as government agency that invests proceeds from Ontario’s carbon 
market into the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
 People’s Republic of China 
2007 China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP): Green Credit Policy (“Opinions on Enforcing Policies and 
Regulations on Environmental Protection to Prevent Credit Risk”) 
MEP and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC): Green Insurance Policy (“Guiding 
Opinions on Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance”) 
2008 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and MEP: Green Securities Policy (“Guidance 
Opinions on Strengthening the Oversight of Public Companies”) 
Shanghai Stock Exchange: Shanghai CSR Notice and Shanghai Environmental  
Disclosure Guidelines 
2009 Shenzhen Stock Exchange: Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed Companies 
2012 CBRC: Green Credit Guidelines 
2013 MEP and CIRC: “Guiding Opinions on Implementing the Pilot Programs of Compulsory 
Environmental Pollution Liability” 
2014 CBRC: Green Credit Monitoring & Evaluation mechanism and Key Performance  
Indicators Checklist 
PBOC: Green Finance Task Force 
MEP and CIRC: “Guiding Opinions on Pilot Scheme for Compulsory Environmental Pollution 
Liability Insurance” 
2015 PBOC: Green Financial Bond Directive and Green Bond-Endorsed Project Catalogue for Bonds 
Issued by Financial Institutions and Corporations 
PBOC: Green Finance Committee 
continued on next page 
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Annex continued 
 People’s Republic of China 
2016 PBOC: Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System 
NDRC and Shanghai Stock Exchange: Green Bond Guidelines 
China Bond Green and Climate-Aligned Bond Index 
2017 State Council: Establishment of five green finance pilot zones in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong, 
Guizhou, and Xinjiang 
MEP and CSRC: Environmental Disclosure for Listed Companies 
CSRC: Guidelines for Green Bond Issuance by Listed Companies 
MEP and CIRC: Draft Guideline on Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance 
Shanghai’s Lujiazui Financial City: Lujiazui Standard of Green Finance 
2018 CSRC and MEP: Mandatory ESG disclosures for listed companies and bond issuers by 2020 
 Hong Kong, China 
2016 Securities and Futures Commission: Principles of Responsible Ownership 
Financial Services Development Council: Report on “Hong Kong as a Regional Green Finance 
Hub” 
2018 Hong Kong Quality Assurance Agency: Green Finance Certification Scheme 
 France 
2001 French National Assembly: Passes the New Economics Regulation law and introduces the 
reporting requirements on ESG issues as part of a broader framework on “ethical” aspect of 
financial practices 
2010 French National Assembly: Passes the “Grenelle II” law, outlining the national commitment  
in favor of the environment, as well as environmental reporting requirements for  
asset managers 
2015 French National Assembly: Passes Law on Energy Transition for Green Growth (ETGG), outlining 
procedures for the assessment of climate-related risks and addressing the role of the financial 
sector in the green transition 
2017 Banque de France: Launches Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) for the sharing 
of experiences of the supervisory dimensions of climate- related and environmental risks and green 
finance 
 India 
2007 Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainable Development and Non-Financial Reporting  
– Role of Banks 
2011 Ministry of Corporate Affairs: National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental and 
Economic Responsibilities of Business 
2012 Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI): Annual Business Responsibility Reporting 
2014 SEBI: Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvIT) Regulations 
2015 Reserve Bank of India: Priority Sector Lending – Targets and Classification 
Indian Banks Association: National Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Financing 
2016 SEBI: Guidelines for the Issuance and Listing of Green Bonds 
2017 SEBI: Disclosure Requirements for Issuance and Listing of Green Bonds 
 Indonesia 
2012 Bank Indonesia: Green Lending Model Guidelines for Mini Hydro Power Plant Projects 
Government Regulation on Social and Environmental Responsibility of Limited Liability Companies 
2014 OtoritasJasaKeuangan (OJK) / Financial Services Authority: Roadmap for Sustainable Finance in 
Indonesia 2015–2019 
2015 IFC, USAID, OJK: Clean Energy Handbook for Financial Service Institutions 
continued on next page 
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Annex continued 
 Indonesia 
2017 OJK: Framework and regulation for green bond issuance in Indonesia 
OJK: Regulation on the Application of Sustainable Finance for Financial Services Companies, 
Issuers and Publicly Listed Companies 
 Japan 
2012 Ministry of the Environment: Principles for financial action towards a sustainable society 
2014 Financial Services Agency: Japan Stewardship Code 
2015 Tokyo Stock Exchange: Corporate Governance Code and Infrastructure Fund Market 
2017 Ministry of the Environment: Green Bond Guidelines 
 Kenya 
2015 Kenya Bankers Association (KBA): Sustainable Finance Initiative (SFI) Guiding Principles 
2017 KBA, Central Bank of Kenya, Capital Markets Authority and the National Treasury: Green Bond 
Programme 
 Republic of Korea 
2008 Government launches the Republic of Korea’s Green Growth Strategy and provides a strategic 
policy framework 
2009 Ministry of Strategy and Finance and Financial Services Commission: announce a certification 
system to verify green projects and companies’ eligibility for funds under government’s plans to 
promote investment into green industries 
2013 Export–Import Bank of Korea: First financial institution in Asia to issue green bonds 
2017 Korea Development Bank: Issuance of green bonds worth $300 million, using proceeds to finance 
or refinance investments in renewable energy projects, low-carbon emission technology, and green 
transportation 
 Mongolia 
2014 Bank of Mongolia & Mongolia Banking Association: Mongolia Sustainable Finance Principles and 
Sector Guidelines 
 Netherlands 
2014 De Nederlandsche Bank: Central Bank mandate updated to include “sustainable prosperity” and 
“financial stability,” as well as equipping the DNB with new macro-prudential instruments and tools 
to fulfill the task. 
2017 Dutch Pensions Federation: Declaration to create an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
covenant for pension funds. 
De Nederlandsche Bank: Organizes workshop on “Central Banking and Green Finance” 
2018 De Nederlandsche Bank: Organizes International Climate Risk Conference for Supervisors 
 Philippines 
2008 Government of Philippines: National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Law 
2011 Securities and Exchange Commission: Corporate Governance Guidelines for Companies 
Corporate Responsibility Act updated 
2015 Government of Philippines: Joint Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility for Governments  
(Local Government Units Pool) 
 Singapore 
2010 Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX): “Guide to Sustainability Reporting for Listed Companies” 
2015 Association of Banks in Singapore: Guidelines on Responsible Financing 
2017 Monetary Authority of Singapore: Green Bond Grant Scheme 
 South Africa 
2011 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa: “Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA)” 
2015 Banking Association South Africa: Principles for Managing Environmental and Social Risk 
2017 Johannesburg Stock Exchange: Green Bond listing requirements and creation of Green  
Bond Segment 
continued on next page 
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 Thailand 
2008 Stock Exchange Thailand and Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand: Guidelines for 
Sustainability Reporting 
2014 Stock Exchange Thailand: CSR Reporting Requirements 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand: Sustainability Development Roadmap for Listed 
Companies 
 Turkey 
2014 Banks Association of Turkey: Sustainability Guidelines for the Banking Sector 
2015 Borsa İstanbul: ESG Reporting Guide 
 United Kingdom 
2012 London Stock Exchange: Mandatory Disclosure of Carbon Emissions for Listed Companies 
2015 Bank of England: Governor Mark Carney highlights the Bank’s view on climate change 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA): Report on the impact of climate change on the UK 
insurance sector 
2016 Bank of England: Publishes further research on climate change and central banks and organizes 
workshops and conferences on the subject on climate risks and financial stability; co-chairs the 
G20 Green Finance Study Group 
 Viet Nam 
2015 State Bank of Vietnam (SBV): Directive on Promoting Green Credit Growth and Managing 
Environmental and Social Risks in Credit Extension 
SBV: Action Plan of Banking Sector to Implement the National Green Growth Strategy  
until 2020 
2016 SBV: Circular on lending transactions of credit institutions and/or foreign bank branches  
with customers 
2017 SBV: Renewed commitment to implementing the Green Growth program and the program of 
preventing climate change 
Source: Compiled by authors, drawing on Volz (2018). 
 
